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ABSTRACT 
I provide some considerations on scientific thought experiments, focusing on their epistemic value. 
First, I outline the distinctive features of scientific thought experiments, provide some historical 
background and, as an illustration, describe two thought experiments: Galileo’s on falling bodies and 
Stevin’s on inclined plane. I take thought experiments in physics as an example from which more 
general conclusions can be drawn – about thought experiments in other natural sciences, but also in 
philosophy, mathematics, and other sciences. Further, I present Kuhn’s epistemic puzzle as well as 
some proposed solutions. This closely relates to the question what kind of processes are involved in 
scientific thought experimenting. The satisfactory answer must consider scientific discoveries. I 
outline the mental model account as the most promising account since it best incorporates the findings 
of cognitive science. I conclude with two issues that the account needs to resolve and the role 
cognitive science can play in this. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Thought experiments are employed in very diverse areas. They play a central role in 
philosophy which is in big part an ‘armchair pursuit’, as Williamson aptly puts it. By this he 
refers to the fact that traditional methods of philosophy ‘consist of thinking, without any 
special interaction with the world beyond the chair, such as measurement, observation or 
experiment would typically involve’ [1; p.1]. However, thought experiments play a 
significant role in most empirical natural sciences as well. Physics, for example, includes an 
impressive number of them. Its birth in the 17
th
 century is characterized by some ingenious 
thought experiments by Galileo, Newton and Leibniz (Galileo’s falling bodies, Newton’s 
bucket, and Leibniz’s space shift), Einstein relied heavily on them (e.g. chasing a light beam, 
elevator or moving train) in the creation of relativistic physics, and they were crucial in the 
development of quantum mechanics (e.g. Heisenberg’s gamma microscope, Schrödinger’s 
cat, and EPR experiment). We often encounter them in mathematics, sociology, political 
science and history, but also partly in art [2]. Some find them in everyday life as well. 
Nersessian, for example, posits that experimenting in thought is involved in such mundane 
cognitive tasks as figuring out whether a large sofa would fit through the door, or what the 
best route from one place to another would be [3]. Others even recognize their usefulness in 
therapy. Gendler, for instance, suggests that fear of flying can be overcome by repeatedly 
imagining oneself flying safely [4]. 
Given the diversity, it is impossible to provide an all-encompassing definition of a ‘thought 
experiment’. There are, however, certain common characteristics that all thought experiments 
share. Namely, conducting a thought experiment involves contemplating an imaginary scenario 
with the aim of acquiring a piece of information. Specifics then depend on the area in which 
the thought experiment is conducted. Most work has been done on thought experimenting in 
philosophy and natural science (esp. physics), and researchers mostly agree that the 
differences between them are not in kind, but in degree. Moreover, thought experimenting in 
social sciences seems closer to such activity in philosophy than in natural sciences, so a 
unified account is undoubtedly preferable. Thus, in this paper I take thought experimenting in 
physics as an example from which more general conclusions can be drawn – about such 
activity in other natural sciences, but also in philosophy, mathematics, and other sciences. 
First, I will outline the distinctive characteristics of scientific thought experiments, provide 
some historical background and, as an illustration, describe two thought experiments: Galileo’s 
on falling bodies and Stevin’s on inclined plane. Further, I will present the epistemic puzzle, 
which was first formulated by Kuhn, as well as some proposed solutions. This closely relates 
to the question what kind of processes are involved in scientific thought experimenting. I will 
conclude by presenting the mental model account which is, in my opinion, the most 
promising account since it best incorporates the findings of cognitive science. 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS 
Conducting a scientific thought experiment involves contemplating an imaginary scenario 
with the aim of illustrating, supporting or refuting some scientific hypothesis or theory. One 
distinctive feature of thought experimenting is that one reasons about a particular set of 
circumstances in order to reach a conclusion which does not pertain only to the described 
situation, but it is applicable more generally. That is, the conclusion, derived from this 
particular situation, has repercussions for certain hypothesis or theory. In the case of physical 
thought experiments, a certain hypothesis or theory concerning physical phenomena is 
confirmed or disconfirmed. (In less spectacular cases, thought experiments serve as heuristic 
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devices, providing a graphic illustration of a scientific theory.) Another distinctive feature of 
thought experimenting is that the means by which we reach a scenario is imagination – we 
more or less vividly imagine a certain situation – and not observation. 
Thought experiments, as their name already indicates, are liken to actual experiments, the 
main difference being that the latter are not conducted in thought, but in the real world. In 
both cases, we are supposed to draw from a particular situation some general conclusion 
concerning the actual world. A major difference, however, is that actual experiments can fail to 
confirm our predictions, while it is not immediately clear how thought experiments can fail. 
This is why P. Duhem objects to the justificatory use of thought experiments in physics. He 
argues that by invoking a ‘fictitious experiment’ a physicist ‘is justifying a principle not by 
means of facts observed but by means of facts whose existence is predicted, and this 
prediction has no other foundation than the belief in the principle supported by alleged 
experiment’. This is a vicious circle, Duhem argues, and concludes that thought experiments 
cannot teach us anything about the world, at most they can suggest hypotheses which can be 
tested only indirectly after the whole theory is constructed and its consequences compared 
with an actual experiment [5; pp.202-205]. 
In general, Duhem considers physical theory as “a system of mathematical propositions, 
deduced from small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, 
and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws” [5; p.19]. As such, it is not explanatory, 
but descriptive, a logical construction of given physical phenomena. It is therefore not 
surprising that thought experiments as well as models in his account merely serve as illustrations 
of the theory, thus facilitating our understanding. They are not a means of discovery. 
Certainly, Galileo, one of the founding fathers of modern physics, would disagree with 
Duhem’s disregard for thought experiments. His falling bodies thought experiment results in 
a rejection of the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones, but also 
in a new proposal that all bodies, regardless of their weight, fall with an equal speed. 
Concretely, Galileo imagines two stones of different weights being tied together and asks 
about the speed of their fall. Obviously, the heavier stone, which on its own falls faster than 
the lighter one, will now, tied to the latter, fall a bit slower, while the latter will now fall a bit 
faster due to the faster speed of the first. The speed of the fall of the two bodies tied together 
is therefore in between the speeds of the two bodies falling separately. However, the two 
bodies tied together form a unity as well and this new body is the heaviest of them all and it 
should therefore fall the fastest. Contradiction! The new body cannot fall with two different 
speeds at the same time, and Galileo argues that the only way out of this paradox is to posit 
that the speed by which a body falls is independent of its weight [6]. 
When we, together with Galileo, imagine the proposed scenario and let it run, the falsity of 
Aristotelian theory becomes immediately obvious to us, and we do not need to perform any 
actual experiment to make sure as Duhem would have it. His contemporary, E. Mach, who 
was first to systematically study scientific thought experiments, has a more favourable 
opinion of them. In general, thought experiments help to prepare actual experiments, but 
some deliver results so convincingly that they make an actual experiment redundant. Thought 
experiments, such as Galileo’s, are crucial for scientific progress since they lead ‘to 
enormous changes in our thinking and to an opening up of most important new paths of 
inquiry’ [7; p.138]. He believes that their value resides in their ability to access unarticulated 
knowledge that we acquired in our previous contacts with the world: “Everything which we 
observe imprints itself uncomprehended and unanalysed in our precepts and ideas … In these 
accumulated experiences we possess a treasure-store which is ever close at hand, and of 
which only the smallest portion is embodied in clear articulate thought” [8; p.28]. 
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Mach describes this kind of knowledge as instinctive and points out that we feel at once that 
the result of a thought experiment is correct. The thought experiment he analyses is Stevin’s 
inclined plane thought experiment by which he established the force needed to prevent an 
object to slide down a frictionless inclined plane. Stevin imagines an endless chain wrapped 
around a triangular prism with a horizontal base. There are two possibilities: the chain is in 
equilibrium or not. If it is not, then it must move continuously, thus constituting perpetual 
motion, which we immediately recognise as absurd. Therefore, the chain must be in 
equilibrium. Next, he imagines that the lower part of the chain, hanging over the prism, is cut 
off. Thus, only the links along the two diagonal planes remain, and clearly, the system is still 
in equilibrium. From this, Stevin infers that two bodies on two different inclined planes are in 
equilibrium if their weights are proportional to the lengths of the two planes. The description 
of the thought experiment is accompanied by two diagrams of the two main stages in the 
experiment – the prism with the endless chain wrapped around it and the prism with 
shortened chain – which adds to the persuasiveness of the experiment [8]. 
Stevin did not have to actually perform the experiment in order to confirm his finding. The 
thought experiment is persuasive enough to justify the conclusion. In fact, the experiment, 
which requires frictionless plane, could not be performed at all – a reminder that also real 
experiments rely not only on observation, but also on abstracting away certain conditions and 
on predicting what would the results in idealized circumstances be. 
Now, it is difficult to be a sceptic about physical thought experiments since they clearly 
work – the history of physics is a proof of that. There are many examples of thought 
experiments by which physicists confirmed or disconfirmed a certain physical hypothesis or 
theory. The real puzzle occupying philosophers of science is rather whether one really 
acquires new knowledge of the real world by simply contemplating imaginary scenarios. If 
the answer is affirmative, then one needs to explain what kind of knowledge is so acquired 
and by what process in particular. And if it is negative, then one needs to explain why it 
seems to us that we learned something new and how this comes about. 
THE EPISTEMIC PUZZLE 
The formulation of the puzzle is due to Kuhn, who belongs to the next stage of systematic 
research of thought experiments from the 1950s through the 1970s, another important 
researchers from these stage being Popper and Koyré. He states it in the following way: 
“How, then, relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a thought experiment lead to new 
knowledge or to new understanding of nature?” [9; p.241]. 
As we have seen above, Duhem denies that thought experiments can be a source of 
knowledge and allows them only as a source of hypotheses, which are later, if incorporated in 
the theory, compared with observation. Mach, on the other hand, acknowledges their 
epistemic value – some thought experiments are crucial for scientific progress since they give 
access to unorganized, non-propositional knowledge that we previously acquired through 
experience. The acquired knowledge is therefore empirical knowledge of our physical world, 
which we actually already possessed, but was before a thought experiment unavailable in 
propositional form. 
Kuhn himself views thought experiments in the context of scientific practice and recognizes 
their importance in times of scientific revolutions. They help scientists to recognize the 
limitations of the old paradigm and facilitate acceptance of the new. This is not a simple case 
of uncovering inconsistency in the scientist’s conceptual apparatus. Kuhn points out that our 
concepts always come with physical implications, expectations about their use. 
Consequently, a certain concept can be in a perfect logical order and yet its use does not 
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correctly reflect what the world is like. The function of thought experiments is to reveal such 
cases. The imagined situation explicitly presents already available, but not yet assimilated 
empirical information which the current scientific concept cannot capture. This shows that 
the conceptual apparatus does not fit all situations and it must be revised. 
Kuhn solves the epistemic puzzle in such a way that thought experiments without any new 
empirical data teach us something new about our scientific concepts and their physical 
implications, and by this about the world itself. As Kuhn puts it, thought experiments can 
‘disclose nature’s failure to confirm to previously held set of expectations’, and second, 
‘they can suggest particular ways in which both expectation and theory must henceforth be 
revised’ [9; p.261]. 
From 1990s onwards, the presented solutions were further developed, new ones were 
proposed, and research on scientific thought experimenting was enriched by forming closer 
relations with research on thought experimenting in other domains. One proposal is platonic 
rationalism defended by Brown [10]. He argues that there are some special cases of thought 
experiments which at the same time destroy an old theory and establish a new one; in other 
words, these experiments are simultaneously destructive and constructive. Such is, for 
example, Galileo’s falling bodies thought experiment in which Aristotelian theory that 
heavier bodies fall faster is rejected and replaced by the theory that all bodies fall at the same 
speed. He calls them Platonic thought experiments since they afford us a direct insight into 
the abstract realm of universals. By grasping, or ‘non-sensorily perceiving’, relations between 
universals we acquire a priori knowledge of truths regarding the laws of nature, which are in 
his account necessitation relations between independently existing universals. In this he 
follows the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong account of the laws of nature. 
Brown argues that in conducting scientific thought experiments, we sometimes grasp the laws 
of nature a priori, solely by intuition. An opposite view, thoroughly empiricist in character, is 
defended by Norton [11]. According to him all knowledge about our world ultimately derives 
from experience, so Brown’s interpretation of thought experiments as a source of a priori 
knowledge of the laws of nature must be rejected. He strenuously objects to intuition, or 
quasi-perceptual rational insight being a means by which we acquire knowledge since its 
working is utterly mysterious. On the other hand, thought experiments are not real 
experiments since they are only conducted in the head, and therefore cannot provide new 
empirical data either. This leaves only one option, namely, as Norton puts it, thought 
experiments ‘can only reorganize or generalize what we already know about the physical 
world and make it explicit’ [11; p.335]. Thought experiments thus provide new information 
about the physical world based on the rearrangement of old data. Moreover, he argues that 
thought experiments are nothing more than arguments which take us from our assumptions to 
the conclusion, namely to the outcome of the thought experiment. Now, if assumptions are 
only reorganized, then a thought experiment is a deductive argument, and if generalization is 
involved, then it is an inductive argument. Either way, thought experiments as epistemic 
devices are to be evaluated as arguments. 
Brown and Norton propose diametrically opposed solutions to Kuhn’s puzzle. They agree 
that thought experiments provide new empirical knowledge in the absence of any new 
empirical data, but draw different conclusions from this. Brown concludes that new data must 
come from some other source and that in a thought experiment we gain a rational insight into 
this source which is an abstract realm of universals and consequently of the laws of nature. 
Norton, on the other hand, concludes that new knowledge is elicited from old empirical data 
by deductive or inductive arguments. 
Both solutions are quite unappealing. Norton’s ‘argument view’ totally disregards the special 
nature of thought experiments. Why would we bother devising an imaginary scenario by 
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dressing arguments up if a basic argument does the job? There must be some function that is 
particular to a thought experiment and that an argument cannot perform on its own. 
Moreover, a thought experiment is a twin of real experiment, and if the first is just a 
disguised argument, then so is the latter. Indeed, a real experiment can also be stated as an 
argument, but does this mean that it is nothing more than an argument? Surely not, but why 
would then be any different in the case of a thought experiment? 
Brown’s ‘Platonistic view’ fares even worse since the proposed epistemic method is 
unfamiliar and in need of explanation. Brown tries to strengthen his position by drawing 
parallels with Platonism in mathematics, but physics and mathematics differ significantly in 
character and aims. Mathematics is highly abstract, and while mathematical reasoning can 
provide predictions about nature, this is not its main purpose. On the other hand, providing 
such predictions is the main task of physics. Physical theory describes and explains the 
physical world, and it must be supported by observations and experiments. Why would then 
physical laws or the laws of nature, as Brown calls them, be about some mysterious 
universals inhabiting the Platonic, abstract realm? If it does not make much sense 
metaphysically, it makes even less sense epistemically. How do we come to know such laws 
directly? How does this special ‘sense’ work? It would be easier to claim that we discern 
them from the regularities that we observe in the physical world, but this option is 
unavailable to Brown. In Platonic thought experiments, the old theory is rejected and 
replaced by a new one without any new empirical information being provided, solely based 
on rational insight into abstract realm. 
Brown and Norton both understood Kuhn’s puzzle as wondering how new knowledge can be 
gained given that thought experiments are conducted entirely in one’s head without any new 
empirical data being provided. However, besides knowledge, Kuhn also mentions a new 
understanding of nature, and his own solution is that thought experiments provide a better 
understanding of physical concepts and their applications to the physical world. If novelty is 
not limited to knowledge, the number of possible solutions increases. For example, Elgin [12] 
and Stuart [13] further explore the connection of thought experiments with understanding. 
One possibility is also Mach’s suggestion that thought experiments provide access to non-
propositional knowledge. This idea is further developed in the mental model account [14, 15]. 
Additionally, its proponents Nersessian and Miščević claim that thought experiments can also 
result in new experiences, concepts, beliefs, or abilities etc. 
Another question that an epistemological account of scientific thought experiments must 
answer is what is involved in this experimenting, namely, what processes are involved. 
Norton denies that there is anything epistemically distinctive about it – we merely conduct 
ordinary deductive or inductive reasoning, we execute an argument. True, an argument is 
‘disguised in some vivid picturesque or narrative form’, which gives it ‘special rhetorical 
powers’, but epistemically, it is irrelevant [16; p.1139]. Brown, on the other hand, posits 
intuition as a special faculty by which we access the abstract realm and acquire a priori 
knowledge of the laws of nature. However, he cannot plausibly explain how it works, and can 
only claim resemblance with mathematics where the use of intuition is quite established. 
While it seems more plausible that thought experimenting is epistemically distinctive, as 
Brown claims, it is not very likely that we possess some special faculty reserved exclusively 
for this task. It is far more likely that we employ a set of various cognitive processes that 
primarily evolved in order to perform some more mundane tasks, and were only later adopted for 
this more sophisticated use. And because of this, I believe that scientific thought experimenting 
can be satisfactorily explained only if we turn to cognitive science and its findings for support. 
One such example is the naturalistic version of the intuition based account. For example, 
Gendler claims that in scientific thought experimenting, due to focus on a specific scenario 
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(and not on a general schema), quasi-sensory intuitions are evoked, which results in new 
beliefs on contingent features of the natural world [4]. Consequently, the distinctive feature 
of intuitions involved in scientific thought experimenting is not their subject matter –
 similarly as observations, they deal with the contingent features of the natural world – but 
the way in which we come to possess them – they are not the result of some explicit 
reasoning process that we are conscious of, but they appear immediately in our mind while 
contemplating an imaginary scenario. 
In explaining the nature and functioning of intuitions as well as of the imagination which is at 
the core of thought experimenting, the naturalist account relies on the findings of cognitive 
science. One difficulty to be addressed is the evolutionary explanation of the capacity to 
intuit, which seems to cast doubts on the reliability of intuitions. Much work still needs to be 
done, and both could profit from this interaction. 
MENTAL MODEL ACCOUNT 
Another promising naturalistic account explains thought experimenting as a form of mental 
modelling [14, 15]. The mental model was first developed and used in cognitive science. 
Nersessian further developed the original idea, supplementing it with findings from cognitive 
science, concluding that the relevant form is a form of ‘simulative model-based reasoning, 
where inferences are made through constructing and manipulating models, whether 
conceptual, physical or computational’ [17; p.310, 18]. 
She bases her account upon the idea that mental modelling is a fundamental form of human 
reasoning, which can be inferred from numerous experimental findings. The notion of 
‘mental model’ was first used by psychologist K. Craik in 1943. He posits that on many 
occasions people reason by conducting thought experiments on internal models of real 
phenomena and that each model is structurally, functionally or behaviourally analogous to the 
real phenomenon. His idea was popularized in the early 1980s. Today one can distinguish at 
least three independent research streams within cognitive science employing his idea. The 
first uses the term to explain the effects of semantic information in logical reasoning. The 
second uses it to explain empirical findings according to which people, when reasoning about 
a certain situation described to them, first built a representation of the structure of a situation 
as a basis for their reasoning. The third does not focus on representation in working memory 
as the first two, but rather on the long-term representation of knowledge. It attempts to 
explain experimental results showing that people use organized knowledge structures related 
to physical systems when trying to figure out manual control systems and devices [17]. 
Nersessian believes these empirical findings show that mental modelling is a fundamental 
form of human reasoning, and further supports this hypothesis with findings from research on 
mental imagery, mental spatial simulation, mental animation as well as embodied mental 
representation. In her opinion, the main ingredient of mental modelling is simulation, which 
was already pointed out by Craik. Today proponents of this view speculate that the capacity 
evolved as a means for simulating possible ways of manoeuvring within the physical 
environment and for solving problems affecting the survival. The ability to anticipate future 
events and possible outcomes of actions is undoubtedly highly adaptive and should be 
possessed by many animals. Human beings are different in that they can create mental models 
not only from perception, but also from description. Now, in scientific thought experimenting 
this ordinary capability is simply more refined and adapted to scientific problem-solving or , 
as Nersessian says, it is put “in service of creative reasoning about nature” [17; p.312]. 
In conducting a physical experiment, for example, a mental model of a certain physical 
situation is built, which complies with the constraints related to the representation of physical 
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phenomena. They are determined by experience and current understanding; for instance, by 
explicit as well as implicit knowledge of the spatiotemporal relations, entities and processes 
involved, the causal structure and so forth. Such restrictions are causal coherence, spatial 
structure and mathematical consistency. And the function of stories and diagrams is not only 
ornamental, but it also conveys restrictions which are consequently incorporated in the 
model. This enables faster reasoning that often could not even be performed in a 
propositional form. In addition, epistemic access to the features of representations which are 
not available in propositional form explains why thought experimenting can lead to new 
discoveries about the world. Finally, its reliability is plausibly explained given that thought 
experimenting is based on the mundane cognitive capacity for mental modelling [17]. 
Nersessian concludes her paper by pointing out that the cognitive-scientific findings on which 
she bases her account relate to much simpler forms of reasoning than those used in scientific 
thought experimenting. Additionally, they are mostly about the use of mental models in 
working memory, but in thought experimenting also information from long-term memory is 
invoked. Therefore, the next step would be for cognitive scientists to investigate if her 
hypothesis can be experimentally supported [18]. 
I agree with Nersessian that research on embodied mental representations looks promising in 
explaining how stored, tacit information from long-term memory connects to the working 
memory representation, and that it should be further developed. In general, the functioning of 
the mind can only be understood in the context of its relationships to the physical body 
interacting with the world. The importance of embodied cognition for the mental model 
account of thought experiments is highlighted elsewhere [19]. 
In that paper, we also ask whether the mental model account can be successfully applied to 
thought experiments conducted in other domains. We focus on philosophical thought 
experiments, more specifically, on those by which we are trying to determine whether 
something is metaphysically possible or necessary. The most common such experiments elicit 
essentialist intuitions concerning the nature of things, which is not something that we easily 
glean from our everyday interactions with the world. Characteristically, in conducting such 
experiments, we do not rely so much on imagination, but on the capacity to conceive, which 
is more abstract and thus seems more detached from perception than from imagination. The 
question is whether in these cases the mental model account provides adequate explanation. 
This is pertinent because it is preferable to have one unified account, but also because within 
physics itself some experiments are very abstract, and it seems impossible that the proposed 
situations could be imagined. Such experiments are found in quantum mechanics and the 
theory of relativity [19]. 
Nersessian’s tentative answer is that the mental models represent demonstratively, but that 
this does not mean that vivid, picture-like or movie-like imagery is required. Research in 
neuropsychology shows that perceptual systems play an important role in imaginative 
thinking, which is also supported by evolutionary considerations. On the other hand, research 
also shows that internal representations are sketchier than external pictorial representations. 
Therefore, in some thought experiments, constructed models can be even more schematic and 
symbolic. This is the beginning, but further details must be provided in order for the answer 
to be satisfactory – a task for philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. 
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